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Abstract. Hong Kong is one of the main economies operating a currency board system 
today. With its currency fixed to the U.S. dollar, the system has functioned successfully since 
it was restarted in 1983. The last time it faced severe challenges was during the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98. However, with the comparatively large depreciation of renminbi 
(RMB, and sometimes referred to as Yuan) during the past two years, a rising question is 
how Hong Kong might be affected by a possible future crisis originating from China. In this 
paper, we examine the impact of RMB depreciation on Hong Kong, with a focus on three 
sectors of Hong Kong’s economy: foreign direct investment, external trade, and tourism.  
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1. Introduction  
nder the currency board system, the Hong Kong dollar has never 
been devalued against its anchor currency—first the pound 
sterling, later the U.S. dollar. The Hong Kong dollar did depreciate 
in the early 1980s, but it was during a period of a floating exchange rate, 
when the Hong Kong dollar was off the currency board system for about a 
decade. During the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, Hong Kong 
experienced strong pressures in financial markets and suffered a recession, 
but the exchange rate of HK$7.80 per U.S. dollar held firm. 
A circumstance that contributed to Hong Kong being able to avoid 
devaluation during the Asian crisis, unlike many countries in the region, 
was that China did not devalue. The Hong Kong dollar appreciated against 
many other currencies, but not against the renminbi (RMB), the currency of 
its most important trading partner and already by that time a financial 
partner of growing importance. 
Today, 20 years later, there is concern that pressures in the foreign 
exchange market might force China to depreciate the RMB. Currently, 
substantial depreciation appears to be a low probability event, at least for 
the next couple of years. But, it is worth thinking about the effects that a 
depreciation of the RMB might have on Hong Kong. Since the East Asian 
financial crisis, British rule has ended and Hong Kong has reverted to 
China. Hong Kong’s trade, finance, politics, and almost any other aspect 
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one might consider are more closely tied to China than they have been at 
least since the 1940s, and possibly ever. Circumstances have changed since 
the 1990s. Would the effects of a substantial depreciation by China be so 
strong that Hong Kong would have to follow, or else endure a markedly 
more severe recession than it did during the Asian crisis? 
This paper investigates the effects of a hypothetical sudden RMB 
depreciation of 10-30 percent on three aspects of Hong Kong’s economy 
that would be most strongly affected: investment, trade, and tourism. As 
defined by Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, there are four 
traditional key industries in Hong Kong: financial services, tourism, 
trading and logistics, and professional and producer services. All these 
sectors are closely connected with China, and thus would be first and most 
impacted by sudden situations in its giant neighbor. There is plenty of 
literature and data for tourism and trade. Meanwhile it is hard to perform 
aggregate analysis on the financial services sector and the professional and 
producer services sector. This paper examines foreign direct investment by 
business, which is one of the factors making Hong Kong an important 
international financial center. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews 
Hong Kong’s situation during the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis. 
Section 3, 4 and 5 investigate the foreign direct investment, external trade 
and tourism, respectively. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. Sections 3-5 
are developed independently. 
 
2. Hong Kong during the East Asian financial crisis, 
1997-98 
The 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis originated in Thailand, and then 
rapidly spread through other East and South Asian economies. Directly 
influenced economies included Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and 
Japan. The crisis was a mixture of crises in currency, banking, and debt, 
resulting in disastrous turbulence in financial markets and a sharp 
slowdown of the real economy. 
The crisis “officially” started on July 2, 1997, when Thailand announced 
the floating of the baht, which depreciated by 19.5 percent immediately. It 
was only one day after the sovereign transfer of Hong Kong back to China. 
After that, Hong Kong experienced a two-year recession and had a hard 
time recovering. There is an extensive body of literature on the East Asian 
financial crisis, including works focused on Hong Kong. Y.C. Jao’s The 
Asian Financial Crisis and the Ordeal of Hong Kong (2001) provides a 
comprehensive introduction and analysis to the crisis and its impact on 
Hong Kong, and underlies the account here. What Hong Kong suffered 
during the East Asian financial crisis serves as a benchmark and 
comparison for our discussion of the possible effects of a Chinese 
devaluation today. 
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As is shown in Appendix 1, all important economies in East Asia except 
China and Hong Kong chose to allow their currencies float during the 
crisis. All of them depreciated by more than 10 percent versus the U.S. 
dollar by the end of 1997, and the worst performing, the Indonesian rupiah, 
depreciated by more than 80 percent at its low point in 1997. 
 
 
Figure 1. Effective Exchange Rate (1994=100) 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, calculations by Richard Li. 
 
From time to time during 1997-98, international speculators 
accumulated massive short positions in Hong Kong dollars. To counter the 
speculative selling, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) sold huge 
amounts of U.S.dollars to preserve the fixed rate of the Hong Kong dollar 
with the U.S.dollar. The Hong Kong dollar was successfully defended, and 
the currency board system survived. However, as a result of depreciation 
of other currencies in the region, the effective exchange rate of the Hong 
Kong dollar appreciated substantially. 
 
2.2. Financial markets 
In the first few months of the crisis, Hong Kong’s financial markets 
seemed immune to the external chaos, because of the optimism over the 
smooth transition and the inflow of Chinese capital prior to the transfer. 
The Hang Seng Index (HSI, the major equity index in Hong Kong) even 
reached a historic peakon August 7, 1997. Starting in October, however, 
securities markets experienced a rapid downturn. Extremely high volatility, 
including days during which the index moved more than 10 percent up or 
down, occurred during the period. The turmoil lasted a long time, and by 
mid-August 1998, the HSI was down by 60 percent from its high a year 
earlier. 
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As speculators accumulated larger and larger short positions, finally on 
August 14, 1998 Hong Kong authorities decided to directly enter securities 
markets by purchasing shares to push up the prices. The Hong Kong 
government also announced tighter regulatory rules afterwards. The 
government’s unprecedented intervention was strongly criticized by many 
politicians and economists at home and abroad as a violation of Hong 
Kong’s longstanding free market principles. Whether due to those 
measures or not, Hong Kong’s financial markets did start to stabilize. By 
the end of August, the HSI rebounded by 9 percent, and continued to 
recover, surpassing its former peak in the first quarter of 2000. The 
government’s “intervention portfolio” generated a return of more than 100 
percent.  
 
2.3. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
Due to unavailability of data and changes of statistical methods, we are 
not able to comprehensively review the performance of foreign direct 
investment during the East Asian financial crisis. 1Still, for inward FDI 
stocks, published statistics during 1996-1999 shows a slight increase in 1997 
and a sharp decrease in 1998.2 However, inward and outward FDI, in terms 
of both stocks and yearly flows, resumed large positive growth in 1999. A 
main reason for these fluctuations was large ups and downs in asset market 
prices. 
 
2.4. External trade 
Hong Kong has always been an open and trade-dependent economy. By 
the time of the East Asian financial crisis, the ratio of total external trade to 
GDP had been consistently larger than 200 percent. The trade sector 
consequently deteriorated severely during the crisis. As Appendix 2 shows, 
the hardest time for the trade sector was the fourth quarter of 1998, a year 
after the crisis started affecting Hong Kong. Total exports fell 10 percent 
year over year.3Domestic exports dropped much more than re-exports, 
partly due to the appreciation of the effective exchange rate of the Hong 
Kong dollar. Total imports decreased by 13 percent year over year, while 
retained imports decreased 24 percent, reflecting weak domestic 





1 Prior to 1998, the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department did not publish statistics 
about outward FDI. In addition, before 1998, only the inward FDI stock was published, not 
annual inward inflows. Furthermore, from 1998 the department adopted a new statistical 
method, basically shifting from book value to market value as the basis of compilation. 
2 Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department, External Direct Investment Statistics of Hong 
Kong (2015). 
3 In real terms, which in this context means that the change in prices has been taken into 
consideration. 
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The tourism industry was hard hit during the crisis. Tourist numbers 
from Japan, a major tourist source at the time, began to drop as early as the 
second quarter of 1997, before the crisis broke out. Tourist spending also 
decreased sharply in tandem with tourist numbers. However, numbers 
swiftly resumed growth after the crisis, making the tourism industry one of 
the most sensitive sectors to macroeconomic performance. 
 
Table 1. Tourist Numbers and Spending (year-on-year rate of change, %) 
1997 Number Spending 1998 Number Spending 1999 Number Spending 
Annual - 11% - 14.7% Annual - 8% -26.3% Annual 12% -4% 
Q1 9%  Q1 - 25%  Q1 13%  
Q2 2%  Q2 - 16%  Q2 10%  
Q3 - 27%  Q3 10%  Q3 11%  
Q4 - 23%  Q4 5%  Q4 12%  
Source: Calculations by Jao (2001) 
 
3. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) 
3.1. FDI of China and Hong Kong 
Both China and Hong Kong are important international FDI 
participants. According to World Investment Report 2016published by United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 2015 Hong 
Kong was the world’s second-largest recipient of FDI inflows, after only the 
United States, and the ninth-largest source of FDI outflows.4 China was the 
world’s third-largest recipient of FDI inflows, and the third-largest source 
of FDI outflows after the United States and Japan. 
 
Table 2. Hong Kong & China FDI Flows (bn US$) 
 2013 2014 2015 % of GDP (2015) 
Hong Kong FDI Inflow 74.5 114.1 174.9 56.6% 
Hong Kong FDI Outflow 81.0 125.1 55.1 17.8% 
China FDI Inflow 123.9 128.5 135.6 1.2% 
China FDI Outflow 107.8 123.1 127.6 1.2% 
Source: Word Bank, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016. 
 
Table 3. Hong Kong and China FDI Stocks 
 2000 2010 2015 
 Bn US$ % of GDP Bn US$ % of GDP Bn US$ % of GDP 
HK Inward FDI Stock 435.4 253.6% 1067.2 466.8% 1572.6 508.5% 
HK Outward FDI Stock 379.3 220.9% 943.6 412.7% 1485.7 480.4% 
China Inward FDI Stock 193.3 16.0% 587.8 9.6% 1220.9 11.0% 
China Outward FDI Stock 27.8 2.3% 317.2 5.2% 1010.2 9.1% 
Source: Word Bank, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016. 
 
4When this paper was written, the latest version available was 2016, and its statistics are 
actually for 2015. 
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Figure 2. Hong Kong and China’s FDI 
Remark: 1997 is actually the average of 1993 – 1997 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
 
China sees large amounts of inward FDI and fast-expanding outward 
FDI, while Hong Kong is a balanced FDI receiver and generator. Since 1978, 
when it began to introduce elements of a market economy and opened 
itself to the rest of the world, China has been attracting large amounts of 
FDI from all over the world, which is one of the main drivers of its very fast 
growth. China’s outward FDI remained small until 2001, when China was 
accepted into the World Trade Organization. After that, Chinese 
enterprises began expanding their business overseas. From 2002 to 2015, 
China’s outward FDI grew at an average annual rate of about 35 percent, 
and exceeded its inward FDI in 2014, making China a net capital exporter. 
On the other hand, Hong Kong has long been an important financial center 
in Asia, originating large amounts of outward FDI and receiving a lot of 
inward FDI. Its FDI inflows and outflows have been more or less balanced 
over last two decades, with the notable exception of 2015.5 
 
3.2. The FDI connection between China and Hong Kong 
There is close connection between China and Hong Kong in terms of FDI 
flows, as Hong Kong has long been the preferred gateway and service 
platform for Chinese enterprises looking to invest overseas, as well as for 
foreign capital looking to invest in China. Around 60 percent of China’s 
outward FDI goes to Hong Kong, of which a large proportion then goes 
farther afield to invest abroad. For China’s inward FDI, according to 
China’s Ministry of Commerce (2016), in 2015, Hong Kong accounted for 
73.4 percent. As is shown in Appendix 3, China is the largest source and 
recipient of Hong Kong’s FDI, aside from offshore financial centers like the 
British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands (which themselves may in 
part be disguised Chinese FDI). Until 2015, China represented 26.5 percent 
of Hong Kong’s inward FDI stock, and 39.6 percent of outward FDI stock. 
 
 
5 According to UNCTAD (2016), part of the sharp uptick in inward FDI to Hong Kong 
results from the restructuring of two large conglomerates. 
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Figure 3. China Outward FDI by Destinations 
Source: 2015 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment6 
 
With China’s great efforts in advancing its Belt and Road Initiative, it is 
believed that China will be involved in even more FDI activities in the 
coming years. However, despite state-level policies and strategic plans, 
there are many factors influencing FDI, among which the exchange rate is a 
very important one.Below we review some academic literature on this 
subject, and offerour judgment. 
 
3.3. Literature on the exchange rate and FDI 
Considerable research has been done on the relationship between the 
exchange rate and FDI. Though various methodologies and models have 
been deployed, there is still no consensus either in theory or empirical 
studies.Some argue that domestic currency depreciation stimulates inward 
FDI. For instance, Froot & Stein (1991) develop an imperfect capital market 
model and concluded that depreciation of domestic currency, by lowering 
the relative wealth of domestic agents, can lead to foreign investment. 
However, other research shows the opposite result. For example, Campa 
(1993) explains that if a firm produces products domestically, and sets up a 
foreign subsidiary to sell the goods, the appreciation of the host country’s 
currency could generate higher revenue, thus stimulating FDI. 
Carruth, Dickerson, & Henley (2000) point out that one possible reason 
for the mixed results is that the impacts of exchange rate changes on FDI 
differ across industries and FDI types. That is, analysis based on aggregate 
data might lead to ambiguous conclusions. Some later research was based 
on categorization of industries or FDI types,7 to partly disaggregate the 
analysis. For instance, Chen, Rau, & Lin (2006) use data of Taiwan’s FDI 
into China to investigate the impacts of exchange rate on cost-oriented FDI 
and market-oriented FDI separately, and conclude that while the 
depreciation of a host country’s currency tends to stimulate inward FDI 
activity of cost-oriented firms, the depreciation tends to deter inward FDI 
activity for market-oriented firms. 
 
6 The latest version when this paper was written was for 2015, published in September 2016. 
7  Typically, the literature identifies three types of FDI: market-seeking (rent-oriented), 
efficiency-seeking (cost-oriented, export-oriented) and resource-seeking. “Seeking” or 
“oriented” are only terminologies here. 
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In addition, studies have been carried out specifically on China. Their 
results are also mixed. In terms of inward FDI, Yu & Cheng (2010) show 
that expected appreciation of RMB could stimulate FDI inflow in a short 
run, but the long-term effect is ambiguous; they also pointed out that 
appreciation of RMB would reduce the inflow of resource-seeking FDI, 
while increasing that of market-seeking FDI, which was consistent with 
research by Chen, Rau & Lin (2006) mentioned above. For outward FDI, 
Liu & Deseatnicov (2016) find that RMB appreciation has a negative effect 
on China’s outward FDI. Chao’s research (2015), however, shows a 
significant positive correlation between the RMB’s exchange rate level and 
China’s outward FDI. 
Due to Hong Kong’s role as a gateway for capital in and out of China, 
one should first analyze the impact of RMB depreciation on China’s FDI, 
and then extend the analysis to Hong Kong through the channel of direct 
investment between the two. 
 
3.4. The exchange rate and China’s inward FDI 
Depreciation in the RMB may deter market-oriented FDI, but stimulates 
export-oriented FDI. As China is a resource consumer itself, there is little 
resource-seeking FDI into China. It is appropriate to distinguish whether 
FDI is market-oriented or export-oriented. In the first case, foreign firms set 
up affiliates to sell goods in China. Given fixed sale prices in terms of RMB, 
depreciation of the RMB leads to exchange losses when profits are 
repatriated back to the home countries, and thus deters market-seeking 
inward FDI. In the second case, foreign firms set up manufacturing 
facilities in China to produce products for exporting to their home 
countries or third countries.RMB depreciation results in lower production 
costs, including wages, rent, facility investment, etc. This comparative 
advantage would benefit exporting, therefore foreign firms are more likely 
to make export-oriented FDI in China. 
With the gradual shift from export-oriented to market-oriented FDI, the 
overall effect of RMB depreciation should be negative. As there are no 
published statistics of FDI by sectors from Chinese authorities, we are not 
able to analyze its components directly. But according to UNTCAD’s World 
Investment Report 2016, while FDI inflows into the manufacturing sector 
stagnated, inflows to the service sector expanded by 17 percent, rising to a 
record 61 percent of total FDI inflows. The share of the manufacturing 
sector fell to 31 percent. The report claims that rising wages and production 
costs have put an end to the significant edge that China once held in 
manufacturing. On the other hand, with three decades of wealth 
accumulation and residents’ expectations for higher living quality, Chinese 
consumption has grown rapidly and still has great potential for further 
growth, which implies opportunities for foreign companies. A good 
example would be the automotive industry, in which foreign automotive 
companies build manufacturing facilities in China and sell products to local 
consumers. Based on this judgment, it is appropriate to assume the main 
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component of inward FDI to China will gradually shift from export-
oriented to market-oriented. And from the analysis above, depreciation of 
the RMB might deter this process.  
To sum up, with inward FDI shifting from export-oriented to market-
oriented, RMB depreciation is likely to deter FDI. But taking into account 
other factors, such asthe huge potential of the Chinese market, it is hard to 
predict to what extent the effect of depreciation will be negative. 
 
3.5. The exchange rate and China’s outward FDI 
It is more complicated to analyze China’s outward FDI, as outward FDI 
is still at a fast-expanding stage, while inward FDI has entered a more 
mature and stable period.  
Unlike the analysis of inward FDI, for China’s outward FDI, it is more 
appropriate to decompose its origins by ownership types, namely, state-
owned enterprise or not. When making FDI decisions, enterprises owned 
and backed by the Chinese government aim not only at profit 
maximization, but also political objectives, because their foreign 
investments usually follow the government’s national strategies and 
foreign policies. This type accounted for 50.4 percent of total outward FDI 
in 2015. In recent years, private Chinese enterprises have played a more 
and more active role in purchasing foreign assets. Currently, though, 
private enterprises generate only 2.1 percent of total FDI outflows. Mixed-
owner ship enterprises account for the remaining 47.5 percent. We assume 
that they act more like private companies, as they are not directly owned 
and controlled by the government. 
 
 
Figure 4. Decomposition of China’s Outward FDI 
Source: 2015 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
 
As the private sector plays a more and more important role, RMB 
depreciation has a negative impact on China’s outward FDI. State-owned 
enterprises used to be the main source of China’s outward FDI, naturally 
leading to a larger proportion of FDI to less developed economies, because 
of the political peculiarity mentioned above. In this regard, as long as 
government planning is still the core driver, the exchange rate level plays 
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only a minor role in influencing state-owned enterprises’ FDI activities. 
However, as can be seen from the graph above, the share of non-state-
owned enterprises has been steadily expanding in recent years, and we 
have every reason to assume this trend will continue in the coming years. 
Thus, China’s future outward FDI will be more constrained by standard 
economic principles. Furthermore, at least in the near future, Chinese 
enterprises’ outward FDI is by no means efficiency-seeking (export-
oriented), so it is reasonable to assume that their FDI decisions would be 
negatively influenced by the depreciation of RMB, which is consistent with 
the most findings of the literature. 
However, China’s outward FDI is still expected to grow in the long 
term. Under its latest national strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative, China 
will continue to expand its business overseas. Furthermore, at present 
China accounts for only 4.4 percent of global FDI—small compared with its 
roughly 15 percent share in global GDP (evaluated in purchasing power 
parity terms). In the long run, China’s outward FDI can be expected to 
expand further, regardless of temporary exchange rate fluctuations. 
 
 
Figure 5. Global Outward FDI Stock by Economies 
Source: 2015 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
 
3.6. Impact on Hong Kong 
So far, we have investigated inward FDI based on categorizing it as 
market (cost)-oriented or export-oriented, and we have examined outward 
FDI by decomposing the sources into state-owned and non-state-owned 
enterprises. The qualitative result is that the depreciation of RMB has a 
negative impact on both inward and outward FDI. 
Hong Kong’s FDI, as well as related business sectors, would suffer from 
a depreciation of the RMB.As we already mentioned, it is no secret that 
many Chinese enterprises use Hong Kong as a channel to invest overseas, 
and much foreign capital enters China through the same gateway. These 
money flows, though not directly invested in Hong Kong, are counted as 
inward or outward FDI. In this regard, if our analysis that RMB 
depreciation would deter both inward and outward FDI for China is 
correct, it would also cut Hong Kong’s FDI. In fact, Hong Kong benefits 
substantially from its role as a financial platform for China, which is also a 
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reason for its status as an international financial center. Thus, a 
deterioration of China’s FDI caused by RMB depreciation would lead to 
loss in related sectors in Hong Kong, including banking, financial service, 
business consulting and etc. 
 
3.7. Summary 
The impact of RMB depreciation maybe negative for FDI, but the big 
picture suggests that the effect would be temporary. According to logical 
analysis based on pervious literature and the latest statistics, RMB 
depreciation alone is likely to deter both China’s inward and outward FDI, 
and thus also reduce Hong Kong’s FDI as well as hurt related business 
sectors. However, we have argued that one should not analyze FDI based 
on only one factor. In fact, as Athukorala (2003) has pointed out, FDI was 
much more stable than other forms of foreign capital inflows (portfolio 
investment, bank credit and etc.) during the East Asian financial crisis and 
the subsequent depression. Hill & Jongwanich (2009) reached a similar 
conclusion for outward FDI during the crisis and afterwards.Looking at an 
overall picture, then, fluctuations inthe RMB are not likely to have long-
lasting negative effects on FDI. 
 
4. External merchandise trade 
4.1. Hong Kong’s external trade industry 
Hong Kong is the eighth-largest trading economy and the largest re-
export economy in the world. 8  In 2016, Hong Kong’s total external 
merchandise trade was US$973.9 billion. In 2015, only 25.7 percent of its 
total imports were retained for use in Hong Kong; the rest was re-exported 
to other markets. 9  The retained imports ratio has stayed at around 25 
percent over the last decade. In 2016, domestic exports (goods produced in 
Hong Kong) accounted for only 1.2 percent of total exports, the rest being 
produced in other economies and re-exported to other markets. The 
domestic export ratio was around 6 percent in 2005, and has been declining 
steadily over the last decade. After the transfer of sovereignty to China in 
1997, Hong Kong’s economy structure experienced great changes. With 
most of its manufacturing industry having moved to China, Hong Kong’s 
present economy is largely services-based. This is also reflected in the 
trading sector. 
Hong Kong’s external trade sector relies heavily on re-exportation, 
which represents over 98 percent of total exports. Re-exports consist of 
foreign goods exported in the same state as previously imported. Profit in 
the re-export business comes from the difference between the import value 
of goods and the re-export value of goods—the re-export margin. As a 
 
8 Considering re-exportation, the only likely rivals to Hong Kong are Singapore and 
Netherlands. In 2016, re-export values of Hong Kong, Singapore and Netherlands are 
about 450 billion US$, 176 billion US$ and 227 US$, respectively. 
9 The latest data of retained imports are for 2015. 
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percentage of the import value, the re-export margin ranged from 18 
percent to 21 percent over the decade from 2005 to 2015. 
China is the largest trade partner for Hong Kong. It accounted for 50.8 
percent of total trade value of Hong Kong in 2016. It is also the largest re-
export partner of Hong Kong, in terms of both origins and markets. In 2016, 
58.8 percent of Hong Kong’s re-exports originated from China, while 54.3 
percent of re-exported goods were sold to China. 
 
 
Figure 6. Hong Kong’sOverall External Trade 
Source: Hong Kong Trade and Developemnt Council (HKTDC) 
 
 
Figure 7. Hong Kong’s Trade with China 
Source: Hong Kong Trade and Developemnt Council(HKTDC) 
 
4.2. RMB Depreciation and Hong Kong’s External Trade 
A depreciation of the RMB would influence Hong Kong’s trade industry 
in two opposite directions through the re-export channel, and the overall 
effect is likely to be positive. Devaluation would stimulate China’s exports, 
and thus increase Hong Kong’s re-exports originating in China. On the 
other hand, devaluation would also reduce Hong Kong’s exports to China 
(both domestic exports and re-exports originating in third countries). The 
net effect of these changes is likely to be positive, because as shown in 
Figure 4 above, the value of re-export originating in China is larger than 
Hong Kong’s total exports to China. 
The higher re-export margin rate from China strengthens this effect. Re-
export margins of goods from different origins vary considerably. 
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Available data are somewhat old, 10  but historically, according to 
calculations by Hang Seng Bank (2015),11 re-exports originating in China 
are much more profitable than re-exports from other regions. In this regard 
also, then, the influence of a depreciation in the RMB on Hong Kong’s trade 
industry would likely be positive. 
Quantitative estimates for this effect could be obtained by calculations 
based on certain assumptions of the connection between currency 
depreciation and net exports. According to IMF research (2015), “a 10 
percent real effective depreciation in an economy's currency is associated 
with a rise in real net exports of, on average, 1.5 percent of GDP, with 
substantial cross-country variation around this average.”12 Let us assume 
the estimated mean is approximately true with China for the following 
analysis. 
A 10 percent depreciation in RMB would lead to a 27.5 percent rise in 
Hong Kong’s net re-exports from China, and thus generate more profits for 
the trade sector. If we assume that the effective exchange rate of the RMB 
depreciates 10 percent, then according to IMF research, China’s net exports 
would increase by 1.5 percent of GDP. That is, based on data in 2015, 
China’s net exports would increase by 27.5 percent. This would influence 
Hong Kong through the re-export channel: re-exports originating in China 
would rise, while re-exports to China would likely decline. The total effect 
should be an increase in net re-exports from China. We assume it would be 
of the same percentage as the change in China’s net exports, 27.5 percent. 
Taking the re-export margin premium from China into account, it would 
result in a considerable profit surge for Hong Kong’s trade sector. 
 
Table 4. Estimated Effect of 10% Depreciation in RMB on Hong Kong’s Net Exports 
 Billion US$ Billion HK$ % 
Estimated Rise in China’s Net Exports (1) 165.1 = 1282.9 1.5% 
 - China’s Nominal GDP 11007.7   
 - Assumed RMB Depreciation   10% 
China’s Net Export (2) 600.2 = 4663.4  
 - China’s Import Value 1681.7 = 13066.6  
 - China’s Export Value 2281.9 = 17730.0  
Estimated Rise in China’s Net Export (%): (1) / (2)   27.5% 
HK’s Net Re-exports Originating in China (5): (3) – (4)  226.5  
 - Re-export Originating in China (3)  2163.0  
 - Re-exports to China (4)  1936.5  
HK’s Share (Re-exports) of China’s Net Exports: (5) / (1)   4.9% 
Estimated Rise in HK’s Net Re-exports Originating in 
China 
 62.3 27.5% 
Source: World Bank, HK Census and Statistics Department, calculations by Richard Li. 
*Due to data availability, all values above are 2015 based. 
 
 
10 The Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department has ceased to publish the statistics 
because of the limitations of available data. 
11 Shik (2015), figure in Appendix 4. 
12 IMF (2015), figure in Appendix 5. 
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However, the accuracy of the estimate is uncertain due to the 
complicated components and trends of re-exports. First, a large portion of 
re-exports originating in China are re-exported to China. That means Hong 
Kong’s trading companies resell products to China after purchasing and 
processing (in some cases) goods originally produced in China. In this case, 
changes in the RMB would influence both directions in trade, which makes 
it hard to estimate the overall effect. In 2016, this type of trade represented 
40.8 percent of Hong Kong’s total re-exports. Second, the surplus between 
re-exports originating in China and Hong Kong’s total exports to China has 
actually been declining over last decade, as China’s trade surplus has been 
shrinking. Third, as is shown in Appendix 4, the gap between re-export 
margins from China and from other economies has been narrowing over 
time. 
 
Table 5. Re-exports Originating in China by Destinations in 2016 
Destination Value (million HK$) Share (%) 
China 851,427 40.8 
United States 276,730 13.3 
Japan 95,483 4.6 
India 65,521 3.1 
Germany 60,053 2.9 
Source: Hong Kong Trade and Development Council (HKTDC) 
 
Finally, in the current situation, referring only to the RMB-U.S. dollar 
rate exaggerates the effect of the depreciation of the RMB, and results in 
misleading conclusions about its impact on net exports. Typically, when 
people talk about the RMB’s depreciation, they are referring to the bilateral 
exchange rate with the US dollar. However, what really matters to the 
overall performance of China’s exports is the effective exchange rate, which 
is calculated based on weights of trading partners and changes in their 
currencies versus the RMB. The figure below shows historical data on the 
RMB-U.S. dollar rate and the RMB effective exchange rate. Relative to the 
dollar, the RMB started depreciating at the beginning of 2014. However, the 
effective exchange rate continued to rise until the end of 2015, which means 
the RMB was still appreciating relative to currencies of other trading 
partners during the period. The RMB has depreciated by 11.8 percent 
relative to the U.S. dollar since its peak in 2014, while its effective exchange 
rate has only depreciated by 6.8 percent. But the two rates have declined at 
roughly the same pace since 2016.In this regard, depreciating only relative 
to the U.S. dollar may not boost China’s exports much, hence it may require 
a larger devaluation to benefit Hong Kong’s trade industry substantially 
through the channels just discussed. 
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Figure 8. RMB-U.S. Dollar Rate and RMB Effective Exchange Rate 
Source: Bank for International Settlements; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database 
 
4.3. Summary 
RMB depreciation is likely to have a positive impact on Hong Kong’s 
trade industry through the re-export channel. According to our estimate 
based on IMF research, a 10 percent depreciation would result in a 27.5 
percent increase in Hong Kong’s net re-exports from China. 
 
5. Tourism & retail sales 
5.1. Tourist numbers 
Tourist arrivals to Hong Kong boomed between 2003 and 2014, because 
of positive changes in China. Hong Kong has long been a popular travel 
destination in Asia, and tourism is one of the four pillar industries for 
Hong Kong’s economy (along with financial services, trading and logistics, 
and professional and producer services). It developed faster than ever from 
2005 to 2014, when the total number of tourists to Hong Kong increased 
from 23 million to 61 million. China contributed over 90 percent of the 
increase over the period, and accounted for 77.7 percent of visiting tourists 
in 2014. Many factors caused the sharp increase of Chinese tourists, among 
which the Chinese government’s relaxation of restrictions on tourism was 
the most significant one, as pointed out by Cheng (2011). In July 2003, the 
Chinese government announced an Individual Visit Scheme (IVS) for Hong 
Kong travel, allowing Chinese residents to visit Hong Kong at their own 
expense. It was the first time in more than 100 years that Chinese citizens 
were able to visit Hong Kong freely. Chinese tourists flooded into Hong 
Kong over the decade after wards. Also, the political atmosphere was still 
mild following the smooth transfer in 1997; tension between Hong Kong 
democracy activists and the Chinese government, currently high, was then 
low. In addition, rising income and the appreciation of the RMB against the 
U.S. and Hong Kong dollars increased the consumption power of Chinese 
tourists.  
However, falling tourism demand from China caused tourist numbers to 
fall from their peak of 2014. Annual tourist numbers dropped by around 7 
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percent from 2014 to 2016. China accounted for all the decrease, since 
tourist arrivals from other places were still increasing. Several factors 
combined to cause the sudden drop from China. First, China’s economic 
growth slowed in the 2010s, casting a shadow on Chinese households’ 
expectations for income growth. Second, political tensions with the Chinese 
government arose in Hong Kong, deterring Chinese tourists. In the 
meantime, Chinese travel preferences began to change rapidly as a result of 
competition from other destinations, including southeast Asia, Japan, South 
Korea, and Europe. And finally, the RMB depreciated against the Hong 
Kong dollar, which can be viewed as the most important reason. 
 
 
Figure 9. RMB-U.S. DollarExchange Rate and Chinese Tourist Numbers 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database;Hong Kong Tourism Board 
 
Currently, the exchange rate plays a more important role in Hong 
Kong’s tourism industry than it did a few years ago, because shopping is 
now the main purpose of Chinese tourists. Over the booming decade from 
2005 to 2014, Chinese tourists visited Hong Kong for various reasons: 
sightseeing, entertainment, good food, shopping, etc. Nowadays, most visit 
Hong Kong mainly for shopping. Furthermore, Chinese tourists used to 
shop mainly for luxury goods, but in recent years, Chinese visitors have 
been using Hong Kong as a kind of supermarket, as they are buying daily 
essentials. This change makes such shopping trips more sensitive to 
exchange rate changes. Stephen (2014) points out that it results from the 
cheap prices of such goods resulted from Hong Kong’s separate currency 
and tax regime from China. When the RMB was appreciating, shopping 
trips boomed, and when the RMB depreciated unexpectedly, they slowed 
down sharply. This is exactly the case since 2014. 
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Figure 10. Tourist Numbers and Spending 
Source: Hong Kong Tourism Board 
 
5.2. Tourist spending 
Tourist spending experienced the same up and down trends as tourist 
numbers. From 2005 to 2014, total tourist spending in Hong Kong increased 
by four times, while Chinese tourist spending expanded by six times. Total 
tourist spending in 2014 was HK$300 billion (13.3 percent of GDP), and 
Chinese tourists represented 80 percent of that amount. However, after 
peaking in 2014, total tourist spending dropped 21 percent between 2014 
and 2016. Spending by Chinese tourists dropped by 23.5 percent over the 
period, while spending by other tourists dropped 9.2 percent. The decrease 
in spending was larger than the decrease in tourist numbers because per 
capita spending also declined, as is shown in the table below. 
There are two different types of tourists in Hong Kong. The first is 
typical overnight tourists, who stay in Hong Kong for several days. The 
other is day-trippers. Day-tripping is big in Hong Kong, because of the 
shopping considerations mentioned above. Hong Kong is only two hours 
by train from the Guangzhou-Shenzhen metropolitan area, which has more 
than 50 million people. Many visitors from that area visit and return the 
same day. Currently, day-trippers represent about 60 percent of total 
tourists, while overnight tourists represent about 40 percent. 
The two types of Chinese tourists behave differently. As Table 7 shows, 
for day-trippers the main purpose is shopping. For them, if the RMB 
depreciated, Hong Kong products would become more expensive, demand 
for Hong Kong goods would be lower, and thus there would be fewer day-
trippers. If they continued to shop in Hong Kong, though, it probably 
would mean that they really want to buy certain goods, so the per capita 
spending would not be much lower. Another important point regarding 
day-trippers is that compared to other shopping destinations, like South 
Korea, Japan and Europe, Hong Kong has a great locational advantage. In 
contrast, most overnight tourists are from regions comparatively far from 
Hong Kong. Typically, shopping is not their only purpose; they also want 
to go sightseeing, eat good food, etc. Such tourist numbers would not 
decline as much as those of the day-trippers. However, they tend to save 
money by spending less on shopping, and changing their shopping 
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destinations to other regions in the world, when prices in Hong Kong 
become unattractive. Thus they are likely to have lower per capita 
spending. 
 
Table 6. Tourist numbersand per capita spending, changes 
Year Change in RMB Change in tourist numbers Change in per capita spending 
  Sameday Overnight Sameday Overnight 
2014 -2.43% 19.09% 11.63% -0.74% -2.62% 
2015 -4.22% -1.15% -5.66% -0.19% -8.95% 
2016*13 -6.7% -8.74% -3.51% -6.27% -10.40% 
Source: Hong Kong Tourism Board 
 
Table 7. Tourist spending based by category in 2016 (January-June) 
Category Same-day tourists Overnight tourists 
 Value (mn HK$) % Value (mn HK$) % 
Shopping 27,996.53 85.1 37,433.15 65.9 
Hotel 244.57 0.7 7,373.46 13.0 
Meals outside hotels 1,374.55 4.2 6,865.90 12.1 
Entertainment   1,566.90 2.8 
Tours   79.56 0.1 
Others 1,684.13 5.1 3,517.09 6.2 
Source: Hong Kong Tourism Board 
 
5.3. Literature on exchange rates and tourism 
Numerous studies on international tourism demand have been carried 
out since the late 1970s. They find that the exchange rate elasticity of tourist 
spending is significantly negative, but varies by tourist origins and 
destinations. Crouch (1993) summarizes over 300 studies prior to 1993 and 
finds that most use regression analysis to derive tourism demand 
elasticities. GDP growth and exchange rates, as proxies for income levels 
and tourism prices, respectively, are the typical explanatory variables; 
tourist numbers, tourist spending, and hotel rates are the typical response 
variables. Some studies build empirical models for a pair of origin and 
destination over a time span, while others research on various destinations 
at the same time point. According to Crouch, the exchange rate elasticity of 
tourism demand varies a lot across studies, with a mean of around -1, 
which implies that a 10 percent appreciation in prices at the destination 
would lead to a 10 percent decrease in tourism demand, and vice versa. 
Recent literature employs more advanced econometric techniques and 
investigates more explanatory variables. Vogt (2008) and Cheng, Ming, 
Kim, & Thompson (2013) stress the importance of real exchange rate and 
income for both U.S. inbound and outbound tourism. Yap (2011) finds that 
international tourists are sensitive to appreciation of the Australian dollar 
in the short run, but not in the long term. Wang, Chen, Lu & Hwang (2008) 
use a copula approach to examine the negative relationship between 
international tourist arrivals to Asia and exchange rate.  
 
13 The latest data for tourist spending is Jan-Jun 2016, we generated spending data for the 
second half of the year based on the tourist number. 
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Some literature is particularly instructive for our study. Ruane (2014) 
investigates the relationship between Japan’s exchange rate and tourism in 
Guam. When the study was carried out, Japan accounted for about 70 
percent of tourist arrivals to Guam, and the yen was depreciating sharply 
against the U.S. dollar, which is very similar to our hypothesized China 
and Hong Kong situation, except that Hong Kong is not a completely 
tourism-dependent economy. Analyzing Scotland’s tourism, Greenwood 
(2007) finds that the exchange rate has a much greater impact on short-haul 
visitors than long-haul visitors. As we have seen, day-trippers from areas 
adjacent to Hong Kong represent a large share of its tourist arrivals. Cheng 
(2012) adds dummy variables to regression models and concludes that the 
relaxation of visa requirement and the launch of the Individual Visit 
Scheme play a more important role than exchange rate for Chinese tourists 
to Hong Kong. Finally, instead of focusing on realized changes, some 
literature stresses the importance of expectations. For instance, Tse (2001) 
studies the impact of economic factors on tourism in Hong Kong and 
points out that “real tourist expenditure depends on expected income, 
expected exchange rate and price level.” 
 
5.4. Empirical model 
We will use a regression model to investigate Chinese tourism demand 
elasticities with respect to the exchange rate and income. Recent literature 
has been using increasingly sophisticated econometric models and has 
included variables in addition to the exchange rate and income; for 
example, relative inflation, tax and even events like relaxation of visa 
requirements. An entire paper would be required to build such models for 
Hong Kong’s tourism. Instead, we will take a glimpse at the statistical 
relationships by using the old method and the most typical explanatory 
variables – the exchange rate and income. Our model can be expressed as 
follows. 
 
Vt = β0 + β1ERt + β2Incomet + εt 
where for each time t: 
Vt: tourist number or tourist spending 
ERt: exchange rate 
Incomet: Chinese GDP 
εt: error term 
β1, 2: elasticities to be estimated 
 
All variables are yearly data transformed into year-on-year percentage 
changes. We not only investigate the impact on total Chinese tourist 
numbers, but also examine the two types of tourists we have described as 
well as the effect on the per capita spending of each type. For exchange 
rate, we will examine the bilateral exchange rate between the RMB and U.S. 
dollar (since the Hong Kong dollar is fixed to the U.S. dollar), the effective 
exchange rate of the Hong Kong dollar, and the effective exchange rate of 
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RMB. We will also test the performance of the quadratic form of the 
exchange rate. For Chinese GDP growth, we use annual GDP growth data 
published by the World Bank. 
The data can be found in an accompanying file, issued with this paper. 
The Python notebook (code) of the regression model is available from the 
author upon request. 
 
5.5. Interpretation of empirical results 
Regression models show a positive relationship between the RMB-U.S. 
dollar rate and Chinese tourism demand to Hong Kong, while the impact 
of income level is not significant in most specifications. We have examined 
the RMB-U.S. dollar rate, the Hong Kong dollar effective rate, and the RMB 
effective rate, but only report results for the RMB-U.S. dollar rate due to its 
better regression performance. We decided to include the quadratic form of 
the RMB-U.S. dollar rate based on the improvement in adjusted R-squared. 
We ran the regression model for both no lags and a lag of 1 (for a given 
year, the explanatory variables are growth rate of the year before). For most 
model specifications, the exchange rate, represented by the RMB-U.S. dollar 
rate, has a statistically significant impact on tourist numbers and spending. 
However, in contrast to previous literature, the Chinese income level is not 
significant in most of our models. The reason may be that correlation 
between the annual growth rates of the RMB-U.S. dollar rate and China’s 
GDP is over 0.7, which may lead to multicollinearity in the linear 
regression. It also may be that since over our sample period (2005-2016), 
China’s GDP growth was always positive, it failed to explain the fall in 
tourism since 2014 (“growth of GDP growth” may solve the problem). 
Finally, due to the quadratic form of the exchange rate term, the 
relationship between the exchange rate and tourism demand is not linear. 
However, as the squared power of a 10-30 percentage change is 
comparatively small and thus can be omitted in rough estimation, we can 
take the coefficient of exchange rate in the regression model as the 
exchange rate elasticity of tourism demand in Hong Kong. Our empirical 
results are summarized in Appendix 6. 
RMB depreciation would deter Chinese tourism demand in Hong Kong, 
and day-trippers are more sensitive than overnight tourists. This is shown 
in three aspects of the model. First, with no lag in variables, the exchange 
rate is only significant for total Chinese tourists and day-trippers, though it 
is also significant for overnight tourists when there is a one-year lag. 
Second, the exchange rate can explain about 65 percent of variations in day-
tripper numbers (as measured by adjusted R-squared), while it accounts for 
about 50 percent of changes in overnight tourist numbers. Third, the 
coefficient of the RMB-U.S. dollar rate in the specification for day-trippers 
is twice as large as that for overnight tourists. This is consistent with the 
abovementioned fact that the major purpose of day-trippers visiting Hong 
Kong is shopping. If changes in exchange rate make goods in Hong Kong 
more expensive, day-trippers’ demand for such shopping trips would 
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decrease sharply. Another explanation can be derived from Greenwood’s 
(2007) finding that the exchange rate has a greater impact on long-haul 
tourists (overnight tourists, in this case) than short-haul tourists (day-
trippers to Hong Kong, mainly Chinese). Beside, in all specifications, the 
coefficients of exchange rate are larger when there is a one-year lag. This is 
intuitively reasonable, as normal people tend to plan their travel based on 
known information – realized exchange rate changes, instead of the 
ongoing fluctuations. To summarize, the exchange rate elasticity of Chinese 
tourism demand to Hong Kong is around -2 to -3, meaning that a 10 
percent depreciation in RMB would lead to a 20-30 percent drop in Chinese 
tourist arrivals. 
Aggregate Chinese tourist spending would be negatively impacted by 
RMB depreciation. However, the exchange rate effect is only significant for 
overnight per capita spending, not for day-tripper per capita spending. 
Generally speaking, regression models fit better for tourist spending than 
for tourist numbers, accounting for over 70 percent of variations in total 
Chinese tourist spending (with no lag). As Tables C and D in Appendix 6 
show, the RMB-U.S. dollar rate is significant for total Chinese tourist 
spending, as well as for spending from Chinese day-trippers and overnight 
tourists separately. This is a natural result of the decrease in tourist 
numbers. However, the exchange rate is not significant for per capita 
spending, except in the specification for overnight tourists with a one-year 
lag. This implies that day-trippers would not cut their spending much as 
long as they do visit Hong Kong, while overnight tourists may reduce their 
spending with an exchange rate elasticity of -3, which means that a 10 
percent RMB depreciation against the U.S. dollar would lead to about 30 
percent decrease in per capita spending. As a result, though day-tripper 
numbers would drop more than overnight tourists, their aggregate 
spending would decrease by approximately the same percentage. To sum 
up, the exchange rate elasticity of aggregate Chinese tourist spending is 
around -3 to -4, meaning that a 10 percent depreciation in RMB would lead 
to a 30-40 percent drop in Chinese tourist spending. 
However, the exchange rate elasticity of tourism demand may not be as 
large as implied by the empirical results above. One reason maybe that 
over the booming decade, the annual growth rate of tourism demand from 
China was much larger than the annual changes in exchange rate. As a 
result, the coefficients in the regression model will be large, thus leading to 
a large exchange rate elasticity of tourism demand. In fact, as pointed out 
by Cheng (2012), the main reason of the tourism boom was the launch of 
the Individual Visit Scheme, which had nothing to do with exchange rates. 
In this context, the effect of exchange rate implied by the empirical models 
is exaggerated. However, with the maturing of Chinese tourism market, the 
exchange rate should in the future have the normal impact identified in the 
economic literature on tourism. 
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5.6. Retail sales 
The retail sales sector benefits the most from growth in tourism, as it 
attracts the largest share of tourist spending. Tourist spending runs 
through many channels, including retail sales, hotels, entertainment, 
catering etc., but for Hong Kong, retail sales is the most important one. 
Shopping typically accounts for 70 to 80 percent of Chinese tourist 
spending. Retail sales only covers consumer spending on goods and does 
not include spending on services such as entertainment and transport. In 
this regard, tourist spending on shopping is included in retail sales, but 
tourist spending on entertainment, tours and similar items is not. The share 
of Chinese tourist spending in Hong Kong’s retail sales expanded over the 
boom period of 2005-2014, peaking at about 38 percent in 2014. After that, 
with the drop in both tourist numbers and per capita spending, tourists’ 
expenditure on shopping declined along with their overall spending. Retail 




Figure 11. Hong Kong Retail Sales and Chinese Tourists’ Shopping Expenditure 
Source: Hong Kong Tourism Board 
 
According to our calculations below, falling Chinese tourist expenditure 
on shopping would definitely hurt retail sales in Hong Kong. If the RMB 
further depreciated by 10 percent, spending on shopping from Chinese 
tourists would shrink by 20-30 percent. If we assume that local retail 
consumption and shopping expenditure from other tourists do not change 
 
14 The local retail consumption is calculated by subtracting the total tourist spending on 
shopping from the total HK retail sales, thus it may not be the accurate value. 
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much, as shopping spending from Chinese tourists represents around 30 
percent of the total Hong Kong retail sales, retail sales would drop by 6-10 
percent. 
 
Table 8. Tourist Spending 
 2014 2015 2016*15 
Retail Sales Value (1) 493.3 475.2 436.6 
Overall Visitor Spending 300.8 271.5 238.3 
 - Same-Day Visitor Spending 
  - By Chinese Tourists 










 - Overnight Visitor Spending 
  - By Chinese Tourists 










Chinese Tourists' Spending as Part of Retail Sales: (1)+(2) 189.6 166.4 137.4 
 - Share of (1) 38.4% 35.0% 31.5% 
Source: Hong Kong Tourism Board 
 
5.7. Summary 
Hong Kong’s tourism and retail sales industry would be negatively 
impacted by China’s devaluation. RMB depreciation would deter tourism 
demand from China, but its impact is greater on day-trippers than 
overnight tourists, in terms of tourist numbers. On the other hand, 
however, per capita spending by overnight tourists is more sensitive to 
exchange rates than is spending by day-trippers. The overall effect would 
be a large decrease in aggregate tourist spending. Given that spending 
from Chinese tourists represents over 30 percent of Hong Kong’s retail 




In this paper, we first reviewed Hong Kong’s situation during the 1997-
98 East Asian financial crisis, then investigated the impact of a hypothetical 
sudden RMB depreciation on Hong Kong by analyzing three key sectors: 
foreign direct investment, eternal trade and tourism. 
RMB depreciation is likely to deter both China’s inward and outward 
FDI, and thus also to reduce Hong Kong’s FDI as well as hurt related 
business sectors. Our analysis shows that China’s inward FDI is gradually 
shifting from export-oriented to market-oriented, and the latter will be 
deterred by depreciation in RMB. On the other hand, as non-state-owned 
enterprises make up a larger share of China’s outward FDI, China’s FDI 
activities should become more sensitive to exchange rate changes. 
However, we also find that FDI is much more stable than other forms of 
foreign capital inflows during economic fluctuations. In addition, taking 
China’s huge economic size into account, China’s FDI is still expected to 
 
15 The latest data for tourist spending are for January-June 2016, so we generated projected 
spending data for the second half of the year based on the tourist numbers. 
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expand in the long run. As a service platform, Hong Kong may suffer from 
short-term stress, but is likely to participate in the long-run growth in 
China’s FDI. 
Hong Kong’s trade sector is likely to benefit from RMB depreciation 
through its re-export channel for China. After breaking down Hong Kong’s 
external trade statistics, we find that re-exports account for most exports 
and a large share of imports. To some extent, re-exports serve as a channel 
for China’s external trade, and Hong Kong profits from re-export margins. 
A depreciation of the RMB would stimulate China’s net exports, and 
therefore increase net re-exports generated from China. Since re-export 
business from China yields higher margins than re-exports from elsewhere, 
this would lead to more profits for Hong Kong’s trade industry. 
Tourism and retail sales will suffer greatly from depreciation in RMB. 
Our detailed analysis on tourist composition shows that tourists from 
China play a dominant role in Hong Hong’s tourism sector. RMB 
depreciation will deter tourism demand from China, but its impact is 
greater on day-trippers than overnight tourists, in terms of tourist 
numbers. On the other hand, however, per capita spending by overnight 
tourists is more sensitive to exchange rates than is spending by day-
trippers. The overall effect is a large decrease in aggregate tourist spending. 
Given that spending from Chinese tourists represents over 30 percent of 
Hong Kong’s retail sales, devaluation of the RMB would lead to a 
contraction of Hong Kong’s retail sector. 
Looking beyond this paper, the next step would be to investigate more 
industries and find the most appropriate theories and models for Hong 
Kong. Aside from FDI, trade and tourism, the property market, securities 
market, and entertainment industry are very important to Hong Kong’s 
economy as well. They deserve further and deeper analysis. 
Hong Kong has been highly integrated with China economically and 
financially since 1997. However, it retains its special political system, 
currency and tax regime, etc. It is much more than a simple free port and 
international financial center. During our research, we found that little 
literature has been developed specifically about Hong Kong, or that it is too 
old to accommodate recent developments. Therefore, more efforts are 
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Appendix 1. Major Asian Currencies versus the US Dollar (July 1 to December 31, 1997) 
  Currencies Depreciation   
  Chinese RMB < 0.5%   
  Hong Kong dollar < 0.5%   
  Indonesian rupiah - 47.6%   
  Japanese yen - 11.5%   
  Korean won - 47.6%   
  Malaysian ringgit - 35.2%   
  Philippine peso - 34.1%   
  Singapore dollar - 14.6%   
  New Taiwan dollar - 14.8%   
  Thai baht - 41.2%   
Source: Calculations byJao (2001); some currencies depreciated further in 1998. 
 
Appendix 2. Exports and Imports of Hong Kong, Year-on-Year Growth Rate (%)16 
 Exports Imports 
 Total Exports Re-exports Domestic Exports Total Imports Retained Imports 
1997 Annual 6 7 2 7 8 
Q1 4 5 - 4 6 8 
Q2 6 7 * 7 6 
Q3 4 4 6 7 14 
Q4 10 10 5 8 3 
1998 Annual - 4 - 4 - 8 - 7 - 14 
Q1 1 2 - 5 - 2 - 9 
Q2 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 - 4 
Q3 - 7 - 7 - 9 - 10 - 19 
Q4 - 10 -9 - 15 - 13 - 24 
1999 Annual 4 5 - 7 * - 12 
Q1 - 5 - 4 - 9 - 10 - 23 
Q2 - 2 * - 13 - 8 - 23 
Q3 8 11 - 8 7 - 2 
Q4 12 14 1 12 6 
Notes: * means change of less than 0.5% Source: Calculations by Jao (2001) 
 
Appendix 3. 2015 Hong Kong FDI by Home/Destination Economies (Billion Hong Kong 
Dollars) 
 Inward Outward 
Economy Inflows Stock Outflows Stock 
BVI 437.5 32.4% 4,325.5 35.1% -16.4 -2.9% 4,840.5 40.8% 
China 200.8 14.9% 3,270.3 26.5% 306.6 55.1% 4,701.8 39.6% 
CI 404.3 29.9% 861.7 7.0% 224.5 40.3% 455.2 3.8% 
Netherlands 34.4 2.5% 778.7 6.3%         
Bermuda 59.4 4.4% 569.7 4.6% 24.0 4.3% 227.0 1.9% 
Singapore 23.3 1.7% 343.1 2.8% -8.2 -1.5% 71.4 0.6% 
USA 3.0 0.2% 314.6 2.6% -17.0 -3.1% 85.7 0.7% 
Other 188.8 14.0% 1,872.3 15.2% 43.2 7.8% 1,487.8 12.5% 
Total 1,351.5 100.0% 12,335.9 100.0% 556.7 100.0% 11,869.4 100.0% 
Source: Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department, External Direct Investment Statistics of Hong 
Kong 2015. Notes: BVI = British Virgin Islands; CI = Cayman Islands. 
 
16 The growth rates are in real terms, that is, the change in prices has been subtracted from 
the nominal values. According to Jao (2001), prices declined by 2-6% during the East Asian 
financial crisis. 
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Appendix 4. Re-export Margins by Origins 
 
Source: Hang Seng Bank 
 
Appendix 5. Effect of a 10% Real Effective Depreciation on Real Net Exports 
 
Source: IMF; note that this is generalized, not specific to Hong Kong 
 
Appendix 6: Empirical Results 
Table A. Results for Chinese Tourist Numbers 
Response Variable Coefficients for Variables Adjusted r-squared 
 Constant Chinese GDP RMB-US$ RMB-US$2  
All Tourists 25.7249 -1.7800 2.1680  0.287 
All Tourists 26.0926 * -1.2158 2.1914 ** -0.2812 * 0.497 
Day-Trippers 20.1648 0.3411 2.4903 * -0.3926 * 0.617 
Overnight Tourists 9.3923 0.2083 1.1756 -0.2364 0.354 
Notes: ** means significance (p value < 0.05); * means (p value < 0.1) 
 
Table B. Results for Chinese Tourist Numbers (with one-year lag) 
Response Variable Coefficients for Variables (with lag 1) Adjusted r-squared 
 Constant Chinese GDP RMB-US$ RMB-US$2  
All Tourists 12.7928 -0.4005 1.4742  -0.021 
All Tourists 18.4448 -0.4421 3.2916 ** -0.5662 ** 0.484 
Day-Trippers 11.5427 1.1527 4.0543 ** -0.7754 ** 0.645 
Overnight Tourists 10.6412 0.1127 2.1727 * -0.5025 ** 0.489 
Notes: ** means 5% significance level (p value < 0.05); * means 10% significance level (p value < 0.1) 
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Table C. Results for Chinese Tourist Spending 
Response Variable Coefficients for Variables Adjusted r-squared 
 Constant Chinese GDP RMB-US$ RMB-US$2  
AllTourists 20.6920 -1.0672 3.1995 **  0.561 
AllTourists 21.1631 -0.3443 3.2294 ** -0.3603 ** 0.748 
Day-Trippers 14.7568 1.3334 3.5730 ** -0.2979 ** 0.904 
Overnight Tourists 17.4091 -0.1978 3.0721 ** -0.3777* 0.637 
Same-Day per Capita -13.7492 2.1511 0.6960 -0.0175 0.525 
Overnight per Capita 0.8441 0.4869 1.4487 ** -0.1515 0.562 
Notes: ** means 5% significance level (p value < 0.05); * means 10% significance level (p value < 0.1) 
 
Table D. Results for Chinese Tourist Spending 
Response Variable Coefficients for Variables (with lag 1) Adjusted r-squared 
 Constant Chinese GDP RMB-US$ RMB-US$2  
AllTourists 1.1319 0.9266 2.2709  0.237 
AllTourists 7.4123 0.8803 4.2903 ** -0.6291 ** 0.519 
Day-Trippers -9.4751 4.0093 ** 4.3830 ** -0.8004 ** 0.894 
Overnight Tourists 7.2177 0.5769 4.2135 * -0.6071 * 0.383 
Same-day per Capita -21.7607 * 3.0482 ** 0.5708 -0.1389 0.506 
Overnight per Capita -6.0592 0.8427 1.7980 -0.1115 0.433 
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